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Preface 
As part of its Environment, Economy, and Trade program, the 
CEC has explored in recent years new avenues for trade in 
environmental goods and services with the objective of 
informing the North American public on opportunities to green 
trade in North America. In 2003, it published a document, 
entitled Market-based Mechanisms for Carbon Sequestration, 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy in North America: 
What are the Options, that examines the different market-based 
mechanisms that could be used to encourage the sequestration of 
carbon, increase energy efficiency, and support the development 
and use of renewable energy sources. In 2004, the CEC 
published Greening Trade in North America: Shade-grown 
Coffee/Sustainable Palm/Renewable Energy, a report reviewing 
existing schemes of payments for the provision of environmental 
services. The present report aims to complement this work by 
surveying payments for environmental services (PES) schemes in 
the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Chantal Line Carpentier 
Head, Environment, Economy and Trade Program 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
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Executive Summary 
 
Payments for environmental services (PES) are relatively new schemes seeking to 
support positive environmental externalities through the transfer of financial resources 
from beneficiaries of certain environmental services to those who provide these services 
or are fiduciaries of environmental resources. This report surveys PES schemes in the 
Western Hemisphere and analyzes the main differences and similarities between PES 
models as well as their strengths and limitations. In addition, the report identifies 
conditions for the success of PES schemes and highlights experiences that could emerge 
as best practices allowing PES to maximize their positive impacts both in terms of 
environmental and socioeconomic outcomes.1  
 
The basic principle behind PES is that resources users and communities that are in a 
position to provide environmental services should be compensated for the costs of their 
provision, and that those who benefit from these services should pay for them, thereby 
internalizing these benefits. There is no commonly agreed definition of PES schemes, but 
a series of classifications based on the type of environmental services, the geographical 
scope, the structure of markets, or the types of payments involved. This lack of common 
definition/classification reflects the great diversity of existing models. However, it also 
generates some confusion and lack of clarity in the literature as to which schemes should 
be considered payments for environmental services.  
 
More than 300 PES schemes have been inventoried in the world. Most of them are recent 
or have been running for a few years only, and several PES schemes remain experimental 
in scope or are still in their pilot phase. Consequently, there are few empirical studies that 
document best practices and lessons learned. However, some initial lessons and emerging 
best practices have been documented. The survey of PES schemes conducted for this 
report shows that a multiplicity of models coexists and that no single one has so far 
emerged as a standard. Moreover, PES schemes are usually adapted to the very specific 
conditions under which they are established and to the specific characteristics of markets 
for different environmental services (watersheds, biodiversity, carbon sequestration, 
landscape beauty).  
 
One finding of this report is that PES schemes may not constitute a cost-optimal 
instrument in all circumstances. Indeed, their success depends in great part from pre-
existing conditions. PES systems work best when services are visible and beneficiaries 
are well organized, and when land user communities are well structured, have clear and 
secure property rights, strong legal frameworks, and are relatively wealthy or have access 
to resources. 
 
PES schemes focus on those environmental services for which there is an existing market 
demand, or for which such demand can emerge under appropriate conditions. Over the 
                                                 
1 The findings presented in this report are based on a survey of published and grey literature, as well as on 
selected interviews with PES specialists and practitioners. Twenty-five PES schemes in 15 countries were 
surveyed for this report.  
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last decade, the use of PES schemes for watersheds, biodiversity, carbon sequestration 
and landscape beauty has gained popularity. PES systems tend to work best when the 
value of environmental services is high for beneficiaries and the costs of providing 
services is low. Markets for environmental services differ in geographic scope, strength 
and structure of demand, the competitiveness, nature and price of commodities sold, and 
the number of transactions. Generally speaking, it appears from the review of markets for 
environmental services that local markets are often better defined than global ones, 
allowing a more precise definition and valuation of services. This can lead to more cost-
optimal payments schemes that attribute value to services close to their marginal benefits.  
 
Another finding of this report is that there is a built-in tension in PES schemes between 
the concurrent goals of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. The cost-efficiency of PES 
schemes is closely related to the transaction costs of the system. PES schemes therefore 
seek to minimize those costs. On the other hand, payments delivered under PES schemes 
are more effective when they are targeted and involve detailed management 
requirements. However, such an approach increases the transaction costs of the system.  
Furthermore, equity in PES schemes is better served by untargeted payments to small 
land users. This approach raises transaction costs by multiplying participants in the 
system and decreases the effectiveness of payments. There are, therefore, difficult trade-
offs between cost-efficiency, effectiveness and equity involved in developing PES 
schemes.  
 
The design of PES schemes plays a central role in guaranteeing their success. PES 
schemes tend to work best when they have the following characteristics:  
 
? They are based on clear and consensual scientific evidence linking land 
uses to the provision of services; 
? They clearly define environmental services to be provided; 
? Their contracts and payments are flexible, ongoing and open-ended;  
? Their transaction costs do not exceed potential benefits; 
? They rely on multiple sources of revenues delivering money flows that are 
sufficient and sustainable in time; 
? Compliance, land use changes, and the provision of services are closely 
monitored; and 
? They are flexible enough to allow adjustments to improve their 
effectiveness and efficiency and to adapt to changing conditions. 
 
Clearly, different PES schemes vary tremendously in these characteristics, as 
demonstrated by the multiplicity of experiments underway in the hemisphere. These PES 
schemes also face various difficulties and limitations, including the following: 
 
? They are often based on scientific generalizations not supported by 
empirical studies; 
? They are sometimes implemented in a context where they are not the most 
cost-effective method to attain the goals established; 
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? Service providers, users and the service itself are sometimes not properly 
identified; 
? They are executed without a proper monitoring or control mechanism; 
? The cost of environmental services are set arbitrarily and do not 
correspond to studies on demand and economic valuation of the resource; 
? Their design is not based on previous socioeconomic or biophysical 
studies; 
? They may offer perverse incentives to land users, or they may displace 
environmental problems or unsustainable land uses to surrounding areas; 
? They depend largely on external financial resources; and 
? Programs and activities are disseminated poorly among the local 
population. 
 
Among the emerging best practices that can be identified, the diversification of revenues 
for communities involved in PES schemes through the creation of new markets for 
environmental goods and services (non-timber forest products, organic food, ecotourism) 
appears to be one of the most promising. PES schemes can play a significant role in 
supporting such diversification of revenues by including specific support measures for 
market development and revenue diversification in their compensation packages.  
 
Another finding of this report is that PES schemes may not work effectively if poor 
communities, which are most dependent on the land for their livelihoods, are excluded 
from the system. Efforts must therefore be made to integrate these populations and extend 
the benefits of PES schemes to them. Several strategies can be put forward to maximize 
benefits to poor communities and minimize the chance that PES schemes further 
marginalize them:      
 
? Clarify and strengthen land tenure; 
? Create or strengthen cooperative institutions to reduce transaction costs; 
? Define cost-effective and flexible payments mechanisms; 
? Provide flexibility in eligible land uses; 
? Facilitate access to start-up financing; and 
? Invest in community capacity-building 
 
Community capacity building is a key accompanying strategy to support revenue 
diversification and the generation of benefits for marginalized communities. However, 
capacity-building strategies are often lacking in existing PES schemes. 
 
PES schemes have the potential to become very valuable transfer mechanisms to 
internalize positive environmental externalities, and to generate new revenues for 
sustainable development. This potential will be gradually fulfilled as markets for 
environmental services mature over time and as PES schemes become more financially 
sustainable. In addition, their positive effects on sustainable development will be 
maximized if their distributional impacts are considered and if concrete efforts are made 
to build capacities in poor and indigenous communities. 
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Introduction 
 
Economic and market-based instruments have been used for pollution prevention and 
ecosystem conservation for several decades. Most of them try to prevent negative 
environmental externalities (for example, pollution or habitat destruction) through eco-
taxes, charges or other tools based on the polluter-pays principle. In the last decade, new 
approaches have focused on the creation of positive environmental externalities through 
appropriate economic incentives, often in the form of subsidies or other environmental 
programs e.g., agro-environmental programs, for example. 
 
Payments for environmental services (PES) are one of these new approaches seeking to 
support positive environmental externalities through the transfer of financial resources 
from beneficiaries of certain environmental services to those who provide these services 
or are fiduciaries of environmental resources. Over the last decade, the use of PES 
schemes for watersheds, biodiversity, carbon sequestration and landscape beauty has 
gained popularity. 
 
Most PES schemes are relatively recent, with only a few being over five years old, and 
several PES schemes remain experimental in scope or are still in their pilot phase. 
Consequently, it is early to confirm the existence of best practices in this field. However, 
the accumulation of experience and the multiplication of schemes (more than 300 PES 
schemes were inventoried in 20022) allow a preliminary assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of different markets for environmental services, of various PES models and 
of specific schemes that have been undertaken thus far.       
 
The objective of this report is to survey PES schemes in the Western Hemisphere and 
analyze the main differences and similarities between models for them, as well as their 
strengths and limitations. In addition, the report suggests criteria to assess the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the PES approach, identifies critical conditions for the 
success of PES schemes and highlights experiences that could emerge as best practices 
allowing PES to maximize their positive impacts both in terms of environmental and 
socioeconomic outcomes.  
 
The findings presented in this report are based on a survey of published and grey 
literature, as well as on selected interviews with PES specialists and practitioners. 
Twenty-five PES schemes in 15 countries were surveyed for this report. Table 1 shows 
their distribution in terms of environmental services involved and scope of market.3   
 
                                                 
2 Pagiola, S. and G. Platais. 2002a. Market-based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development: The 
Simple Logic of Payments for Environmental Services. In Environmental Matters–Annual Review, July 
2001–June 2002 (FY 2002). Washington, DC: World Bank’s Environment Department. p. 26. 
3 A complete list of PES schemes surveyed is available in Appendix I. 
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Table 1: Distribution and scope of PES schemes surveyed by environmental services  
 
Services  Scope  
Water 15 Local 21 
Carbon 6 National 3 
Biodiversity 9 International 4 
Landscape beauty 2 
Bundled 1 
  
The report is divided into three sections. Section 1 provides a summary description of 
environmental services, and an analysis of the PES concept. Section 2 deconstructs PES 
schemes into their main components in order to assess conditions and elements that can 
influence their effectiveness and efficiency. Section 3 identifies conditions for the success 
of PES schemes. The study concludes with an assessment of the current state of 
development of PES schemes and of the conditions in which they are likely to perform 
best as policy instruments for reaching environmental and socioeconomic objectives.  
 
I. Defining the PES Concept  
 
Since 1961, tropical countries have lost over 500 million hectares of forest cover4 and the 
consumption of forest products has risen by 50 percent worldwide.5 This situation is 
leading to the loss of environmental services that play an important role in the 
livelihoods, economic development and health of populations all around the world. These 
services are generally unknown, poorly understood or simply taken for granted by 
policymakers, private firms or local communities. Consequently, they are seldom taken 
into consideration by markets, due to lack of consumer information or awareness, or to 
the absence of appropriate economic incentives that would influence the behavior of land 
users towards sustainable practices or conservation. PES schemes try to correct this 
market failure by internalizing benefits, thereby creating these missing incentives for the 
provision of environmental services. The first step in this perspective is to define what is 
meant by environmental services and which services can actually be internalized into 
market transactions.  
 
An Overview of Environmental Services  
 
The literature on environmental services and the way they influence human societies has 
been growing both in number and complexity in recent years. Several definitions have 
been put forward to describe and understand the interactions between the natural 
environment and human societies. PES schemes focus on those environmental services 
for which there is an existing market demand, or for which such demand can emerge 
                                                 
4 FAO. 2000a. Global Forest Products Outlook Study. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.  
5 Gardner-Outlaw, T. and R. Engelman. 1999. Forest Futures: Population, Consumption and Wood 
Resources. Washington, DC: Population Action International. 
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under appropriate conditions. Existing services fall within four categories:  water 
services, carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation and landscape beauty. The Costa 
Rican forest law provides a definition of environmental services along the following 
lines: 
 
Those provided by forests and forestry plantations that have an impact on 
environmental protection and improvement. They are the following: 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (fixing, reduction, sequestration, 
warehousing and absorption); protection of water for urban, rural or 
hydroelectric use; biodiversity protection to conserve it and for sustainable, 
scientific and pharmaceutical use; genetic research and improvement; 
protection of ecosystems, life forms and natural scenic beauty for tourism and 
scientific ends.6  
 
PES schemes focus on the environmental services provided by forests conservation, 
reforestation, and sustainable forest exploitation, as well as certain agroforestry or 
silvopastoral practices.  
 
Water services are targeted under numerous PES schemes. The list of water services 
provided by forest ecosystems that are considered under existing PES schemes include:  
 
? Water flow regulation: maintenance of dry season flows and flood control; 
? Water quality maintenance: sediment load control, nutrient load control 
(e.g. phosphorous and nitrogen), chemical load control, and salinity 
control;  
? Erosion and sedimentation control; 
? Land salinization reduction/water table regulation; and 
? Maintenance of aquatic habitats (e.g., maintaining water temperature, 
shading rivers/streams, ensuring adequate woody debris in water).7 
 
Water services provided by forests are complex and often only partially understood. 
Forest services to watersheds depend on several site-specific factors, such as terrain, soil 
composition, tree species, vegetation mix, climate and existing management regimes. In 
addition, watersheds may experience seasonal, annual or multi-year fluctuations that 
make it virtually impossible to project and quantify the provision of specific levels of 
water services at any given time.8
 
                                                 
6 Costa Rican Forest Law (Law 7575, Art.3, Clause k), as cited in Rosa, H. et al. 2003. Compensation for 
Environmental Services and Rural Communities. Lessons from the Americas and Key Issues for 
Strengthening Community Strategies. Fundación PRISMA. p. 19. 
7 Landell-Mills, N. and L. Porras. 2002a. Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? A Global Review of Markets for 
Forest Environmental Services and their Impact on the Poor. London: International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED). p. 112. 
8 For a more detailed analysis of the linkages between land use and water, see: FAO. 2000b Land-Water 
Linkages in Rural Watersheds Electronic Workshop–Synthesis Report, Rome, FAO, 18 September–27 
October. < http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/watershed/watershed/papers/paperewk/pewrken/synthesis.pdf>,  
consulted on 22 June 2004. 
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Biodiversity services are also frequently involved in PES schemes.9 Biodiversity can 
therefore be measured in terms of ecosystems, species and genetic diversity. The list of 
biological services that can be provided under PES schemes include the protection of 
ecosystems of particular value, natural habitats, species, genetic resources or others.  
 
Carbon sequestration services are also involved in numerous market transactions in the 
world and are the focus of several PES schemes. Carbon sequestration occurs when trees 
or other vegetation absorb carbon contained in the atmosphere during their growth. 
Conversely, forest destruction releases carbon into the atmosphere. As a consequence, 
carbon sequestration may involve two types of services: active absorption through 
reforestation or avoided emissions through conservation of forest cover.10
 
Lastly, landscape beauty services are mostly associated with the aesthetic or cultural 
value given to specific sites. Landscape beauty services may involve the protection of 
natural heritage sites, coral reefs, cultural sanctuaries, or even traditional livelihoods as 
part of a combined cultural/environmental landscape protection approach. Few PES 
schemes involve the provision of such services, which are difficult to quantify and 
evaluate due to their cultural foundations. However, these services are increasingly 
introduced in PES schemes as cultural consciousness and the global tourist industry are 
growing.   
 
Payments for Environmental Services: Definition and Rationale 
 
By definition, environmental externalities—negative and positive—are not incorporated 
into the price of products or services that are sold in the market. Consequently, certain 
markets do not favor conservation or pollution prevention through appropriate price 
signals or other economic incentives. This situation generally leads to the growing 
destruction of natural capital or to unacceptable levels of pollution. The traditional 
response to this situation has been to introduce command and control measures in the 
form of laws and regulations on environmental protection, polluting emissions, human 
health or land use, among others.   
 
Over the last twenty years, environmental regimes have evolved towards economic and 
market-based instruments that seek to internalize environmental externalities through 
appropriate price signals and incentive systems that may involve subsidies, fiscal 
policies, the creation of markets for polluting emissions and many other tools 
(Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2003).  At the other end of the spectrum, 
those who contribute to the provision of positive environmental externalities in the form 
of environmental services rarely receive compensation for the benefits they provide. The 
                                                 
9 The Convention on Biological Diversity (article 2) defines biodiversity as: “…the variability among 
living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and 
of ecosystems.”  
10 For more detailed analysis of forest services on watersheds, biodiversity and carbon fixation, see: Bishop, 
J. and N. Landell-Mills. 2002. “Forests Environmental Services: An Overview” in Pagiola, S. et al. 2002.  
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basic principle behind PES is that resource users and communities that are in a position to 
provide environmental services should be compensated for the costs of their provision, 
and that those who benefit from these services should pay for them, thereby internalizing 
these benefits.11 From this perspective, the PES approach mirrors the polluter-pays 
principle by creating positive incentives to environmental protection and conservation.  
 
In comparison to command and control strategies, PES schemes hold the potential to be 
more effective and cost-efficient. Indeed, enforcement of environmental command and 
control regimes rely on the existence of proper institutional and financial resources, 
which are often lacking in developing countries. In this context, regulatory approaches to 
conservation often miss environmental objectives due to the weakness of the 
environmental enforcement system and generalized noncompliance. PES schemes can 
work where regulatory approaches fail by creating an incentive system for conservation 
instead of a set of legal obligations that faces widespread noncompliance due to 
economic counterincentives and a lack of resources for legal enforcement.  
 
In addition, it can be difficult, and sometimes impossible, to enforce conservation 
measures, land use regulations or specific agricultural or forest management practices 
upon poor communities who depend on resource exploitation for their livelihood. 
Regulatory approaches will sometimes hurt these populations by banning activities that 
are essential for their livelihoods and pushing them toward illegal survival patterns. 
 
In comparison to state subsidies, PES can lead to more sustainable outcomes by 
generating a continuous flow of payments.12 Moreover, PES schemes are likely to be 
more cost-efficient than the combination of regulatory approaches and subsidies, which 
require significant state resources to manage. By contrast, PES schemes usually rely on a 
lighter, flexible structure that can be self-supporting in the long run. 
 
PES schemes are also potentially more effective, flexible and cost-efficient than the 
creation of traditional protected areas. They can be implemented where the creation of 
protected areas would be impossible due to socioeconomic or political considerations. 
They can also be easier to administer and allow for a more flexible range of land uses and 
extractive activities that will benefit both socioeconomic development and environmental 
protection. 
 
The Structure of PES Mechanisms 
 
There is no commonly agreed definition of PES schemes, but rather a series of 
classifications based on environmental services, structure, types of payments or others. 
This lack of common definition/classification reflects the great diversity of models, but 
also generates some confusion and lack of clarity in the literature as to which 
                                                 
11 Pagiola, S. and G. Platais. 2002b. Payments for Environmental Services. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank Environment Department, Environment Strategy Notes (3). p. 2. 
12 Pagiola, S. 2002. “Paying for Water Services in Central America: Learning from Costa Rica” in Pagiola, 
S. et al. 2002c. op. cit.  p. 38. 
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mechanisms should be considered payments for environmental services. PES schemes are 
commonly classified by type of services provided, but they can also be classified 
according to the type of payments/transactions they involve.13  
 
However, all PES schemes share the objective of providing environmental services that 
are undersupplied due to the lack of compensatory mechanism, and to provide a 
mechanism by which services can be provided in a cost efficient manner over the long 
run. PES schemes seek to attribute a certain value to environmental services and establish 
appropriate pricing, institutional and redistribution systems that will lead to behavioral 
changes and sustainable and socially optimal land use practices.  
 
PES schemes will tend to work best when the value of environmental services is high for 
beneficiaries and the costs of providing the services is low. However, they can also work 
when the value of services and the cost of their provision are both high, as long as the 
payments exceed the cost of providing the services.14 However, if the value of services 
and the cost of their provision are low, the transaction costs associated with a PES 
scheme might be higher than its value-added in terms of environmental benefits. In that 
case other solutions may be more cost-effective. 
 
Rosa et al. describe the conventional approach to PES in the following way: 
 
? It focuses on the use of economic instruments seeking the lowest possible 
costs for achieving environmental goals;  
? It singles out environmental services (carbon sequestration, water regulation 
or filtration, or single species biodiversity);  
? It shows a preference for simplified and large-scale ecosystems, preferably 
owned by few people, to reduce transaction and monitoring costs; and  
? It seeks to secure private property rights and to reward landowners.15 
 
While each PES scheme is unique, most have a common basic structural design, as 
shown in Figure 1. This model is conceptually appealing for both its simplicity and its 
flexibility in various socioeconomic and environmental conditions. However, its 
application in real-world situations raises several challenges that are brought to light by a 
closer analysis of existing PES schemes. 
 
                                                 
13 Forest Trends developed a typology of four types of PES: public payments, private deals, cap and trade 
schemes, and ecolabeling of products or companies. 
14 Alix J. et al. 2003. Payment for Environmental Service: To whom, where and how much? Guadalajara, 
Mexico: INE/CONAFOR/World Bank. p. 14. 
15 Rosa, H. et al. 2002b. Payment for Environmental Services and Rural Communities: Lessons from the 
Americas. Tagaytay City, The Philippines: International Conference on Natural Assets, Political Economy 
Research Institute and Centre for Science and the Environment.  p. 2. 
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Figure 1: Structure of PES Mechanisms 
 
 
Source: Pagiola, World Bank, 2003.16  
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The first challenge in developing a PES scheme is to define, measure and quantify the 
environmental services (carbon sequestration, watersheds, biodiversity conservation or 
landscape beauty) that are to be generated under the system. This requires significant 
scientific knowledge as well as consultation with stakeholders in order to identify 
services that can attract participation from beneficiaries. The key is to identify which 
services are needed, by which beneficiaries and at which level.17  
 
Beneficiaries can be local (for example, water users in the lower watershed), national (for 
example, state, NGOs or business associations) or international (international 
organizations, multinationals or international NGOs). There can also be a mix of local, 
national and international beneficiaries. The nature, number and origin of beneficiaries 
are directly related to the nature of environmental services generated under the PES 
scheme. Transaction costs are reduced if beneficiaries are few and well organized.  
 
The establishment of a PES scheme also requires the creation of a financing mechanism 
that will gather and manage funds from beneficiaries. In theory, beneficiaries should not 
have to pay more than the value of the services to them. Assigning a proper value for 
environmental services therefore constitutes one of the main challenges in the 
establishment of PES schemes. This valuation process involves economic analysis as well 
as extensive consultations with beneficiaries in order to set up contributions that are both 
acceptable to them and sufficient to fund the PES system and the provision of needed 
environmental services. One key objective of PES schemes is to generate a stable and 
continuous flow of revenues that will ensure the long-term sustainability of the system. 
Revenues can originate from taxes, user fees, state subsidies, direct contributions, grants 
or loans by international institutions or donations by international NGOs or foundations. 
 
                                                 
16 Pagiola, S. and G. Platais. 2002b. op. cit. p. 3. 
17 Bishop, J. and N. Landell-Mills. 2002. “Forests Environmental Services: An Overview,” in Pagiola, S. et 
al. 2002. op. cit.  p. 20. 
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A payment mechanism must also be designed to deliver funds to land users. In theory, 
payments given to land users should be enough to compensate for the cost of 
conservation and the opportunity cost of foregone land uses. Therefore, a balance is 
needed between the maximal payment that beneficiaries are willing to provide and the 
minimal payments that will ensure the provision of services by land users. 
 
PES schemes allow for great flexibility in the design of payments: they can be based on 
the number of hectares that will be subject to land use changes or to specific land use 
practices; they can also be targeted to specific areas or practices or attributed according to 
very general criteria. More sophisticated, targeted payments will tend to be more 
effective, but less cost-efficient as they tend to increase transaction costs. In addition to 
direct payments, PES schemes can also provide non-monetary benefits to land users in 
the form of training, infrastructure or support for revenue diversification or market 
development. 
 
Transactions with land users are generally managed by a payment mechanism entity that 
signs contracts with land users establishing specific obligations in terms of land use, 
production of management plan, reporting, and so on. Contracts have a specific duration 
and may be renewable. In order to reduce transaction costs, land users may be permitted 
to negotiate collective contracts. PES schemes tend to favor collective negotiations with 
land user associations or cooperatives when land users are numerous. Given the 
significant transaction costs involved in meeting contractual obligations, PES schemes 
usually favor larger land users who benefit from economies of scale (unless smaller 
farmers are well organized in cooperatives and associations, as in some Mexican states). 
 
One key challenge in establishing a PES scheme is to keep transaction costs low in order 
to optimize the use of resources collected from beneficiaries. The costs of establishing a 
PES system and managing its first transactions may be high. These costs may involve 
scientific research, consultations with land users and beneficiaries, assessments of current 
land uses and practices, contract design, implementation of a pilot phase, and so on. In 
addition to these initial costs, there are transaction costs associated with the maintenance 
of the system, such as monitoring, contracting, and managing payments. Some of these 
transaction costs can be transferred to land users, but the administrative costs falling upon 
users have to be low to ensure that they derive enough benefits to remain involved in the 
system. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, there is a built-in tension in PES schemes between the concurrent 
goals of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. In order to be effective, payments need to be 
optimized and targeted to higher value land, this involves higher transaction costs and the 
risk of creating inequities since targeted payments are more costly to manage, and higher 
value land tend to belong to wealthy land owners. On the other hand, in order to be 
efficient, PES schemes need to reduce transaction costs. This can be done through 
untargeted payments focusing on large land users. This may be done at the expense of 
smaller, often poor land users, and of decreasing the effectiveness of PES schemes. 
Lastly, PES schemes will be more equitable (but less effective) if untargeted payments 
are used. Equity also involves supporting numerous, small land users and consequently 
 8
raising transaction costs. Figure 2 therefore shows the difficult trade-offs involved in 
developing PES schemes. These trade-offs will be addressed in more detail in the next 
section of this report. 
 
Figure 2: Trade-offs in PES schemes 
Effectiveness 
Optimize payments 
Target most value-added 
High transaction costs 
 
 
Monitoring is also important under PES schemes to ensure that services are generated 
and adjust payments or provide technical assistance when needed. Monitoring is 
important at three levels: implementation/compliance, impact on the generation of 
services and impacts on local users. Effective monitoring is essential to prove 
beneficiaries that their investments are generating land use changes. In addition, initial 
payments are usually established based on ex ante assessments of the costs associated 
with land use changes and of benefits generated. Good monitoring practices allow 
adjustments to payments and contributions to optimize the system. 
 
Lastly, PES schemes have a governance structure that oversees their functioning, 
specifies eligible activities and payments levels, monitors impacts of land use changes 
and the provision of services, and adjusts eligible activities and payments, as appropriate. 
 
Markets for Environmental Services 
 
Markets for environmental services differ in geographic scope, strength and structure of 
demand, the competitiveness, nature and price of commodities sold, and the number of 
transactions. PES schemes have been established for the four types of environmental 
services identified at the beginning of this section. PES scheme are likely to be successful 
only if the nature of markets for the environmental services they are targeting is well 
understood.  
 
One of the challenges in establishing PES schemes is to translate environmental services 
into commodities that can be sold to beneficiaries. This requires accurate information on 
the nature of the market, demand structure and value of services to beneficiaries. 
Equity 
Untargeted payments  
Support small land users 
Transaction 
costs 
Efficiency 
Distributional 
issues 
Low transaction costs 
Untargeted payments  
Focus on large land users
High transaction costs 
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Generally speaking, the more defined a commodity (and the more complex the service 
contract), the higher the transaction cost of the system, yet also the higher the potential 
price obtained on the market. Less defined commodities will be cheaper to manage but 
will obtain a lower payment. Therefore, the key is to find an optimal situation, balancing 
commodity precision and transaction costs. In any case, the success of the PES scheme 
requires a solid understanding of the markets for the environmental services to be sold. 
 
Markets for Watershed Services 
 
Markets for watershed services are usually local in scope with most transactions 
occurring at the watershed level. Markets for watershed protection usually do not involve 
trading commodities such as water quantity or quality, but rather financing land uses that 
are generating watershed benefits.18 Demand for water services mostly originates from 
downstream water users, including farmers, hydroelectric producers, and domestic water 
users in urban areas.19 Given the local nature of demand and the presence of a limited 
number of well-organized beneficiaries (e.g., water or hydroelectric utilities, irrigation 
commissions), it is relatively easy to mobilize downstream beneficiaries and involve 
them in PES schemes.  
 
Watershed-based services are usually funded through user fees to finance improved 
management of the protected area upstream.20 It is therefore essential to develop 
sophisticated hydrological models to link conservation practices with the generation of 
water quality and quantity services in order to make sure that the PES system is providing 
the services for which beneficiaries are paying. 
 
A survey of 61 watershed-based payment schemes conducted by Landell-Mills and 
Porras (2002) found that these markets are more institutionalized and rely on a 
cooperative relationship between demand and supply rather than on competition among 
service providers and beneficiaries. This survey also found an increased willingness on 
the part of beneficiaries to pay for services, as awareness is growing on the importance of 
conservation in upper watersheds for the maintenance of water services. 
 
The improved management of the upper watershed for the maintenance of water services 
is a strategy implemented in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
including Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras and 
                                                 
18 Pagiola, S. et al. 2002. “Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for Forests and People,” in Pagiola, S 
et al. 2002. op. cit.  p. 264. 
19 FAO. 2000b. Land-Water Linkages in Rural Watersheds Electronic Workshop- Synthesis Report. p. 16 
<http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/watershed/watershed/papers/paperewk/pewrken/synthesis.pdf> consulted on 22 
June 2004>.  
20 Pagiola, S. et al. 2003b. Paying for the Environmental Services of Protected Areas: Involving the Private 
Sector. Durban, South Africa, 8–17 September 2003: Fifth World Parks Congress: Sustainable Finance 
Stream.  p. 2. 
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Panama.21 In most cases, the approach favored is the establishment of protected areas 
rather than the creation of PES systems to improve management practices among land 
users. However, watershed-based PES schemes are increasingly used and have been put 
in place in several countries, including the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Brazil. 
 
One of the most famous examples is the system established by the city of New York to 
protect its drinking water sources. In the late 1990s, the city of New York increased water 
fees by nine percent to invest in the protection of the Catskill/Delaware and Croton 
Watersheds. This was done primarily through a land acquisition program and 
conservation easements that expanded the protected area within the watershed to 121,500 
ha. In addition, farmers and forest producers received compensation under new programs 
to remove environmentally sensitive lands from production or to improve forest and land 
management practices.22
 
Another well-known example is the Fondo Nacional del Água (Fonag) in Ecuador. Fonag 
collects contributions from water users, including the water utility of the city of Quito 
and a hydroelectric power utility, to fund conservation practices in the upper watershed 
that provides drinking water for the city of Quito.23 Also in Ecuador, the municipality of 
San Pedro de Pimampiro, in the province of Imbabura, is developing a pilot project 
aiming to protect drinking water sources by paying land users in the upper basin to 
improve forest management in the watershed.24  
 
In the Cauca Valley in Colombia, farmer associations initiated a PES system to address 
concerns regarding the sustainable supply of water for irrigation.25 Since its inception, 
this scheme has led to the adoption of conservation measures in over one million hectares 
of land. The system annually raises US$600,000 in revenues from water user fees.26 
Similarly, farmers in the Guabas River watershed in Colombia have negotiated an 
agreement with upstream land users to improve land use practices in order to maintain 
                                                 
21 World Bank and World Wildlife Fund Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use. 2003. 
Running Pure: The Importance of Forest Protected Areas to Drinking Water. Washington, DC: World 
Bank and WWF. pp. 20–21.  
22 For a detailed description of the New York City case, see ibid. p. 86–9. See also: Landell-Mills, N., and 
L. Porras. 2002b. Silver Bullet or Fools’ Gold? A Global Review of Markets for Forest Environmental 
Services and Their Impact on the Poor. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. 
pp. 134–35. 
23 See Echevarría, M. 2002. “Financing Watershed Conservation: The Fonag Water Fund in Quito, 
Ecuador” in Pagiola, S. et al. 2002. op. cit.  pp. 91–101. 
24 See World Wildlife Fund and Danida. 2003. From Good-will to Payment for Environmental Services. A 
Survey of Financing Alternatives for Sustainable Natural Resource Management in Developing Countries. 
pp. 107–9. 
25 Tsen, W. et al. 2002. Payments for Environmental Services in Mexico. Berkeley, University of California 
at Berkeley – Goldman School of Public Policy. p. 26. 
26 Landell-Mills, N. 2002c. Marketing Forest Environmental Services–Who benefits? London: Gatekeeper 
Series no.104, International Institute for Environmental and Development (IIED). p. 9. 
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dry-season water flows. The system is financed through additional charges for water 
use.27
 
In the states of Paraná and Minas Gerais in Brazil, municipalities receive five percent of 
the state sales tax to finance upper watershed conservation programs to protect drinking 
water sources. This program has led to the conservation of one million hectares of land in 
the state of Paraná and over one million hectares in Minas Gerais.28 Also in Brazil, São 
Paulo’s water utility has agreed to contribute one percent of its revenues to fund 
conservation and forest restoration activities in the Corumbatai watershed.29
 
In Mexico, Semarnat (Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) has initiated 
PES pilot projects in six watersheds.30 The first pilot project in Mexico was initiated in 
the Lerma Chapala Basin in 1995.31 Another pilot PES scheme for watershed protection 
is currently being developed in the Triunfo Biosphere Reserve in Chiapas. In Honduras, a 
PES scheme has been established in the El Escondido watershed to protect the drinking 
water source for the city of Santa Barbara, the second-largest in the country.32
 
Markets for Carbon Sequestration 
 
Carbon markets are essentially global in scope and most transactions involve 
international buyers. Markets for carbon sequestration services are well developed and 
highly competitive. This competition leads service providers to reduce transaction costs 
and to minimize the risk associated with the reliability of carbon credits.  
 
The full deployment of a global carbon market is affected by uncertainty regarding the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the specific rules that will guide its 
implementation. This is affecting both the definition of carbon credits and their market 
price. These uncertainties are likely to disappear when the Kyoto Protocol enters into 
force and its rules are further defined. North America faces a unique situation in that 
context given that each of the three NAFTA parties has a different status under the Kyoto 
protocol, with the United States as a non-Party, Canada as an Annex I Party with 
emission reduction obligations, and Mexico as a Party without emission reduction 
obligations.  
 
                                                 
27 Bishop, J. 2002. Pro-poor Markets for Environmental Services: A New Source of Finance for 
Sustainable Development? Presentation made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Johannesburg, August 28. 
28 May, P. H. et al. 2002. “Using Fiscal Instruments to Encourage Conservation: Municipal Responses to 
the ‘Ecological’ Value–added Tax in Parana and Minas Gerais, Brazil,” in Pagiola, S. et al. 2002. op. cit.  
p. 177. 
29 Bishop, J. 2002. op. cit.  
30 Tsen, W. et al. 2002. op. cit. p. 1. 
31 Ibid. p. 8. 
32 Cohen, S. 2002. Pro-poor Markets for Environmental Services: Carbon Sequestration and Watershed 
Protection. Presentation made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, August 
28. 
 12
Two environmental risks are associated with the creation of carbon markets: the risks of 
seeing tree plantations replace native forests or of financing conservation where no 
deforestation is occurring in the first place (the baseline issue). In the first case, carbon 
markets would create perverse incentives to deforest and afforest with monocultures that 
sequester carbon the most quickly, while in the second case, they would have no real 
value-added in terms of forest conservation, since the forests were protected without 
payments. Carbon sequestration projects must therefore be carefully defined to avoid 
such perverse outcomes. 
 
In their survey of PES schemes, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) reviewed 75 examples 
of payments for carbon sequestration services and showed that the market was rapidly 
evolving on multiple trading platforms, with transactions occurring at various levels 
(regional, national, international) despite persistent uncertainty about the Kyoto Protocol 
entering into force. While PES schemes involving carbon trading are too numerous to 
summarize in this report, a few examples are provided to illustrate how such schemes are 
implemented.33
 
In Chiapas, Mexico, the Bioclimatic Fund was established to manage funds collected 
under the Scolel Té project, a carbon sequestration scheme based on agroforestry 
practices. More than 300 coffee and corn farmers participated in the project by planting 
trees on 20 percent of their land parcels on average to absorb carbon.34 In Bolivia, The 
Nature Conservancy, along with the Bolivian government, Amigos de la Naturaleza, and 
US-based energy companies, have developed the largest forest-based carbon project in 
the world (600,000 ha) to sequester 26 million tons of carbon over 15 years in the Noel 
Kempff Mercado National Park at a cost of US$9.6 million.35 In Argentina, the German 
Development Agency (GTZ) agreed to invest in a project to generate carbon offsets in La 
Plata/Fontana. Under this project, 120,000 ha of native forests will be protected to 
sequester 12.6 million tons of carbon.36
 
Markets for Biodiversity Services 
 
Markets for biodiversity services exist at a local, national and international scale. They 
can therefore resemble carbon or watershed markets, or a mix of both. The diversity of 
biodiversity services generates a multiplicity of demands that increase the complexity of 
creating payments systems. As is the case of watershed services, biodiversity services are 
not sold directly. Instead, specific land uses that are thought to protect species, 
ecosystems or genetic diversity are sold.37
  
                                                 
33 Landell-Mills, N. 2002. op. cit. 
34 Rosa, H. et al. 2003. Compensation for Environmental Services and Rural Communities. Lessons from 
the Americas and Key Issues for Strengthening Community Strategies. PRISMA. p. 27. 
35 Cohen S. 2002. op. cit.   
36 Landell-Mills, N. 2002. op. cit. p. 7. 
37 Pagiola, S. et al. 2002. “Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for Forests and People,” in Pagiola, S. 
et al. 2002. op. cit.  p. 264. 
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Demand for biodiversity conservation is sometimes local but more often global. 
International organizations, foundations and conservation NGOs are major buyers of 
biodiversity conservation services. Pharmaceutical companies are also involved in 
markets for biodiversity services. The value of biodiversity conservation services is 
difficult to establish. For example, certain biodiversity services—such as those arising 
from bio-prospecting—are sometimes based on the option value of future discoveries. In 
this context it is difficult to value services and match demand with supply.38
 
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) surveyed 72 payments schemes for biodiversity services 
and showed that these markets are nascent and in many cases experimental. For example 
in Brazil, rubber tappers receive payments for forest conservation services they provide 
through their management of forest resources.39 In Guyana, Conservation International 
signed an agreement with the government for a conservation concession in 200,000 acres 
of forest.40 In the United States, the Conservation Reserves Program (CRP) consists of 
10–15 years contracts with farmers to remove sensitive land from production and prevent 
land degradation, thereby preserving future biodiversity. 
 
Markets for Landscape Beauty 
 
Markets for landscape beauty are the least developed of all markets for environmental 
services. There is both a national and international demand for these services. The 
ecotourism industry is potentially one of the main beneficiaries, and thus demanders, of 
landscape beauty services. So far governments have been the main suppliers of landscape 
beauty services through the creation of protected areas or the protection of natural or 
cultural heritage sites.41 However, landscape beauty services are increasingly provided by 
local communities and indigenous people since the concept of landscape beauty can also 
include cultural practices, traditional land uses or architectural features.   
 
Landell-Mills and Porras’ (2002) survey of PES schemes included 51 experiences in 
payments for landscape beauty. They found that this market was immature and 
characterized by significant constraints, including a lack of willingness from the 
ecotourism industry to pay for the provision of those services, and an absence of 
sophisticated payments mechanisms.  
 
Markets for Bundled Services 
 
Bundled services are found where different services are sold from a single land area. 
Markets for bundled services share features with markets for environmental services that 
                                                 
38 Bishop, J. and N. Landell-Mills. 2002. “Forests Environmental Services: An Overview” in Pagiola, S. et 
al. 2002. op. cit. p. 20. 
39 See Rosa, H., and S. Kandel. 2002c. Payments for Environmental Services: Brazil. Ford Foundation and 
Fundación PRISMA.  
40 Landell-Mills, N. 2002. op. cit.  p. 5. 
41 Landell-Mills, N. and L. Porras. 2002b. op. cit. p. 158. 
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are incorporated in the bundle. The services can be sold in merged bundles (in which case 
it is impossible to separate the services) or in shopping basket bundles (where specific 
services can be bought and land users sell different services to buyers).  
 
Merged bundles are easier to manage and reduce transaction costs in the PES scheme. 
However, they are less effective since merging services makes it impossible to target 
payments to individual services. The shopping basket approach is therefore better 
designed to maximize returns, but also more complex to manage and more costly.  
 
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) surveyed 28 cases of PES schemes selling bundled 
services and found that they can bring added revenues to land users, but that such an 
approach is more complex to set up since it involves dealing with several services at the 
same time. For example, it may be difficult to establish new forest management 
approaches and techniques that will optimize the production of several services. The 
bundled services approach was used by The Nature Conservancy in Belize, Bolivia, 
Costa Rica and Paraguay to bring additional revenues for biodiversity protection by 
promoting the sale of carbon offsets in biodiversity-rich locations. It was also used by 
Costa Rica’s national power and light company and Norwegian partners to purchase 
watershed protection and carbon sequestration services.42  
 
Generally speaking, it appears from the review of markets for environmental services that 
local markets are often better defined than global ones, allowing a more precise definition 
and valuation of services. This can lead to more cost-optimal payments schemes that 
attribute value to services close to their marginal benefits.43 In addition, it may be easier 
to generate long-term recurrent payment streams in watershed-based markets which are 
local by nature, than for biodiversity conservation or carbon markets, which are mostly 
based on international, one-shot deals. Overall, each market is characterized by its own 
set of strengths and limitations and the way PES schemes adapt to these features is key to 
their success.  
 
 
II. Assessing the Effectiveness and Efficiency of PES Schemes 
 
Several features of PES schemes may affect their effectiveness (ability to reach the 
environmental goal) or efficiency (cost at which the goal is achieved). This section 
attempts to deconstruct PES schemes into their various components to see how each one 
can have an impact on their effectiveness and efficiency. Examples are provided to 
illustrate these positive or negative impacts. The analysis conducted in this section also 
aims to identify some of the main strengths and limitations of PES schemes based on the 
current experience.  
 
                                                 
42 Landell-Mills, N. and L. Porras. 2002b. op. cit. p. 185. 
43 FAO. 2003. Payment Schemes for Environmental Services in Watersheds. Arequipa, Peru, 9–12 July: 
Regional Forum. p. 1. 
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Identifying Beneficiaries and Generating Demand 
 
The creation of PES schemes is only possible if there is a demand for an environmental 
service. Therefore, the first task in establishing PES schemes consists in identifying who 
are the beneficiaries of environmental services and which ones are willing to pay for the 
provision of services. This requires a clear definition of environmental services and a 
careful assessment of existing demand for those services. It is easier to convince 
beneficiaries to participate in a PES scheme when the costs and benefits of environmental 
services are visible and quantifiable. Generally speaking, beneficiaries will be more 
inclined to pay for very specific services, as opposed to general conservation services. In 
identifying beneficiaries, it is also important to identify potential free riders that could 
benefit from the provision of services without contributing in the PES system. This may 
affect contributors’ support for the PES scheme and/or lead to their withdrawal from the 
scheme.  
 
Watershed services are visible and relatively easy to quantify, and the demand is usually 
easy to identify given that the services are provided within a watershed. So far, payments 
in watershed PES schemes have been based on the area to be protected and on specific 
land use practices rather than on the generation of specific and quantifiable levels of 
water services.44 In the long run, this may negatively affect the support of beneficiaries 
for the system, since the linkages between the services they are paying for and the 
benefits they receive are at best indirect. This problem can be avoided by establishing 
baselines and closely monitoring the effects of land use changes on the provision of 
environmental services.  
 
In the case of biodiversity services, it may be more difficult to identify beneficiaries who 
are willing to pay for the protection of ecosystems, species, or genetic diversity. So far 
demand has mostly originated from international conservation organizations and the 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The most important limitation in that context is 
that financing may be provided in the form of one-shot deals that do not provide a 
continuous flow of payments over time. Therefore, there is a significant risk that land 
users revert to past practices once they cease receiving payments. In addition, payments 
by international organizations are not necessarily based on the value of environmental 
services. This may reduce the efficiency of the PES scheme by substituting bureaucratic 
resources allocation criteria to a comprehensive services valuation process. 
 
Carbon sequestration services are relatively well-defined and global in scope, with most 
demand originating from private firms in Europe and Japan. However, the price and 
value of services is still subject to much uncertainty, given the current status of the Kyoto 
Protocol. This raises the risk associated with this market and contributes to limiting 
demand for carbon sequestration services. Nevertheless, international organizations, 
private firms, governments and conservation NGOs are all active in this market. 
 
                                                 
44 Pagiola, S. 2002. “Paying for Water Services in Central America: Learning from Costa Rica,” in Pagiola, 
S. et al. 2002. op. cit. p. 48. 
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Demand for environmental services can exist and yet no transactions take place due to a 
series of factors, including the following:  
 
? Lack of scientific evidence; 
? Existence of cheaper substitutes; 
? Lack of regulatory framework; 
? Co-ordination problems; 
? Inadequate participation; 
? Cultural resistance; and 
? Lack of finance.45 
 
In all these situations, there can be beneficiaries of environmental services, but the 
benefits they receive may not translate into an explicit demand. In these situations, 
specific interventions by the state or other intermediaries may be needed to transform this 
implicit demand into an explicit willingness to pay for environmental services. These 
interventions may include stakeholder consultations, information sessions, institution 
creation, financial support or technical training.  
 
Markets for environmental services can also arise from policy-related or regulatory 
drivers. New regulations, user fees or fiscal incentives may be introduced to create a new 
set of incentives that will drive the development of a market for environmental services. 
For example, a new regulation introduced by the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)—the Surface Water Treatment Rule—forced New York City to consider various 
options to comply with the regulation at the lowest cost possible. After analyzing the 
relative costs of building a new water treatment plant and other land management 
alternatives, the city eventually established a broad system of payments to improve the 
management of the Catskills watershed from which it is obtaining its drinking water. The 
creation of a PES system allowed the city to comply with the new EPA regulation at one-
fifth of the cost of building a new treatment plant. 
 
In that case, new drivers coexist with uncertainty about the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the creation of a global carbon-trading scheme. This creates a complex 
situation in which incentives and risks are pulling in different directions, thereby slowing 
the development of a full-scale carbon market.    
 
International and regional conventions can also drive the creation of markets for 
environmental services. Markets for carbon sequestration services are also developing in 
close relation with regulatory drivers that are linked to national GHG emission reduction 
plans or to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Another example comes from the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convenio para la Conservación de la 
Biodiversidad y la Protección de Áreas Silvestres Prioritarias en América Central, which 
led to the creation of the Mesoamérica Biological Corridor. This initiative attracted 
demand for biodiversity conservation from international organizations such as the Global 
                                                 
45 Landell-Mills, N. and L. Porras. 2002b. op. cit.  p. 215. 
 17
Environmental Facility (GEF) and led to the creation of a PES scheme supporting the 
conservation objectives of the biological corridor initiative.46
 
Generating Revenues for Services Providers 
 
PES schemes must generate a sufficient and sustainable flow of revenues to land users to 
make sure that they implement and maintain land use changes that will generate needed 
environmental services. Payments under PES schemes must therefore be ongoing—as 
opposed to one-time payments—and be open-ended to allow them to last over time.47 
Also, as mentioned before, the level of payments must be high enough to cover the costs 
of implementing new land use practices and the opportunity costs of foregone land uses. 
 
While this seems simple in theory, it is far more complex to set an optimal payment in 
practice, especially when scientific knowledge and valuation methodologies are 
incomplete. In addition, payments are also established according to complex negotiation 
and consensus-building processes involving all stakeholders. The outcomes of these 
processes play a central role in determining the level of payments.48  
 
It can be especially difficult to compensate the opportunity costs of conservation when 
there are several competing land uses in a region where a PES scheme is implemented. 
For example, one study conducted in three regions of Costa Rica found that payments 
were not high enough to compensate land users for the costs of forgone alternative land 
uses such as dairy farming, export-oriented agriculture, or urbanization.49 In such a 
situation, PES schemes may not obtain optimal results if they do not provide sufficient 
incentives to abandon alternative land uses. In that case, an important proportion of land 
users did not enroll in the PES scheme due to the higher revenues obtained from other 
productive land uses. 
 
Different types of compensations can be offered to land users. In addition to monetary 
payments, PES schemes can also provide compensation packages that will include other 
benefits. Recent experience in PES schemes seems to show that it is preferable to support 
a mixed approach in the form of compensation packages combining monetary payments 
and other benefits ranging from access to credit, capacity building, information and other 
collective or individual services.50 These non-monetary benefits seem to be highly valued 
by participants and are key in ensuring the sustainability of land use changes. 
 
Payments must also be flexible in terms of eligible activities and allow various 
sustainable land use practices instead of restricting payments to forest conservation 
activities. An approach focusing only on conservation may be detrimental to poor 
                                                 
46 Esquivel, M.R., and O. Segura Bonilla. 2002. El Pago de Servicios Ambientales en Centro América. 
Heredia : Centro Internacional de Política Económica para el Desarrollo Sostenible (CINPE). pp. 1-2. 
47 Pagiola, S. and G. Platais. 2002b. op. cit. p. 3. 
48 Rosa, H. et al. 2003. op. cit. p. 57. 
49 Miranda, M. et al. 2004. The Socioeconomic Effects of Carbon Markets in Costa Rica. A Case Study of 
the Huertar Norte Region. London: IIED. p. iii. 
50 Rosa, H. et al. 2003. op. cit. p. 52. 
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communities that need to maintain certain land uses to support their livelihoods. It may 
therefore be preferable to support sustainable agroforestry or silvopastoral practices that 
can maximize environmental benefits as well as economic benefits for poor communities.  
 
For example, in a country such as El Salvador with high population density and high 
pressure on land and resources, conservation may not be a realistic option for land users. 
In that context, PES systems in Salvador focus on improvements in land use practices 
such as silvopastoral practices and agroforestry that generate environmental services 
while maintaining land under production.51 An illustration of this approach is the 
Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) in Costa 
Rica, Colombia and Nicaragua that pilots the use of PES to promote the adoption of 
silvopastoral practices in degraded pasture areas.52 On the opposite, Fonafifo’s approach 
in Costa Rica has been criticized for focusing on forest conservation and not including 
other land uses.53
 
The creation of perverse incentives must also be avoided when elaborating the payment 
structure. For example, payments compensating reforestation activities, but not the 
conservation of existing forest cover, may create an incentive to cut down or burn forests 
to undertake reforestation activities and obtain payments. The risk of creating this type of 
perverse incentives is always present and must be carefully considered in the design of 
payments.  
 
In order to be as effective as possible, payments must be targeted to specific land uses 
and/or specific areas. This is necessary to make sure that PES schemes generate services 
where most needed. PES can target highest value lands and land uses according to their 
contribution to environmental services and establish rates accordingly. However, 
targeting payments to optimize their cost-effectiveness also means raising transaction 
costs associated with monitoring and overall management of the payment system.  
 
So far it has proved easier in existing PES schemes to raise funds than to control the land 
use practices that are associated with payments for environmental services. This has 
created a tendency to develop simple conservation payments that are less costly to 
manage but also less cost-effective. For example, in Costa Rica, 70 percent of PES 
resources are allocated for “forest conservation” and all participants are paid on the same 
basis.54 This approach is simple to manage but it fails to discriminate between different 
land use changes and agricultural practices. However, the Costa Rican system has been 
moving away from untargeted payments towards a criteria-based system of payments. 
                                                 
51 Pagiola, S. 2002. Paying for water services in Central America: Learning from Costa Rica,” in Pagiola, 
S. et al. 2002. op. cit. p. 58. 
52 See Pagiola, S. et al. 2004. Paying for Biodiversity Conservation Services in Agricultural Landscapes. 
Environment Department Paper No. 96. Environmental Economics Series. Washington, DC: World Bank, 
May. 
53 See Rojas, M., and B. Aylward. 2003a. Initiatives Based on Payments and Markets for Environmental 
Services in Costa Rica. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
Environmental Economics Program (EEP). Consulted at 
<http://www.iied.org/eep/pubs/documents/MES2.pdf>, on 21 January 2004.p. 97.  
54 Rosa, H. et al. 2003. op. cit. p. 60. 
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While all landowners used to be eligible to participate in the PES scheme, Costa Rica is 
now refining its approach by linking specific revenue sources to specific services. For 
example, hydroelectric power producers finance conservation in their own basin, and 
GEF funding is channeled to lands with high biodiversity interest.55 This allows 
beneficiaries to invest in land use changes that directly impact upon them. 
 
The RISEMP project in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia distinguishes between 
different land uses and adapts payments accordingly. However, the task of setting 
appropriate differentiated payments is complex, especially when selling bundled services. 
Under the RISEMP project, a list of land uses was prepared with a pointing system on 
which payments are based. Two indices were developed: one for carbon sequestration 
and one for biodiversity conservation. Payments are based on an aggregation of scores 
obtained under those two indices.56 The RISEMP system allows for highly targeted 
payments but its transaction costs are higher than for schemes working with simple 
undifferentiated payments.  
 
Payments offered to land users in the Pimampiro watershed in Ecuador are also 
differentiated. They distinguish between different categories of land in establishing 
payments per hectare, with at one end primary forests and unexploited land receiving the 
highest payments and at the other end degraded land or livestock/agricultural land not 
eligible for payments.57
 
As mentioned earlier, targeted payments tend to create distributional inequities and 
benefit land users with higher land value, which tend to be the wealthiest ones. One 
simulation conducted in Mexico according to various payments scenarios came to the 
conclusion that there can be significant trade-offs between efficiency and equity in the 
setting up of PES systems. This report showed that a pure cost-benefit approach would 
reinforce inequities within Mexican ejidos.58   
 
One last observation about payments to land users is that they must be well distributed in 
time. First, land users may need substantial up-front payments to cover the costs 
associated with the elaboration of management plans and investment made to implement 
them. This may require higher up-front payments and lower periodic payments over the 
duration of contracts. Moreover, delays in payments can affect the credibility and 
effectiveness of PES system.59 It is therefore essential to make sure that the payment 
mechanism is efficient and timely. 
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Establishing Scientific Knowledge and Valuing Ecosystem Services 
 
As mentioned in the first section of this report, environmental services are numerous. 
They may be poorly understood and difficult to measure or to link with specific land 
uses. In addition, various types of conservation approaches or productive land uses are 
compatible with the provision of the same environmental services.60 In this context, the 
establishment of PES schemes requires a basic understanding of how environmental 
services are generated, either through natural or managed ecosystems. PES schemes, 
therefore, require reliable scientific knowledge of landscapes and of the relationship 
between land uses and the provision of environmental services.  
 
However, if good science is a basic requirement for the establishment of PES schemes, it 
is also costly to collect accurate data and to develop a sufficient knowledge base to feed 
the elaboration of a PES scheme. The costs of acquiring this knowledge are among the 
most important startup costs for PES schemes. Moreover, the maintenance of a credible 
PES system requires constant updating of data, information and knowledge. There are, 
therefore, clear trade-offs between the extent of data collection and scientific analysis 
needed for the development of a PES scheme and its transaction costs. 
 
The costs associated with scientific knowledge are often too high to absorb locally, and 
external organizations are frequently needed to finance or directly conduct preliminary 
scientific research. In the absence of such support, some PES schemes may be established 
based on an incomplete, imprecise and sometimes inaccurate understanding of the 
relationships between land uses and the provision of services. In that context it may be to 
set up an efficient PES scheme since there is no way of quantifying services provided to 
establish optimal payments, of measuring the differentiated impacts of various land uses 
or conservation practices or of measuring the provision of environmental services. 
 
The complexity and reliability of scientific knowledge varies according to the specific 
environmental and biophysical characteristics of the targeted land area. It also varies 
from one environmental service to another. For example, one weakness of watershed-
based PES schemes is the lack of clear, solid information linking specific land uses with 
the provision of water services.61 The land use-carbon relationship is generally 
considered easier to measure and quantify. It is also characterized by more stability and 
predictability since carbon sequestration is a well-understood, well-documented process. 
Lastly, the relationship between forests and biodiversity tend to be better documented 
than those between forests and water services. This facilitates the creation of 
biodiversity-related PES by reducing the costs associated with scientific research. 
 
Developing appropriate frameworks to value environmental services can be a significant 
challenge, even in presence of accurate data and good scientific knowledge. This exercise 
needs to be done as precisely as possible to ensure the optimization of PES. It is also 
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essential to understand the limitations of economic valuation techniques and to develop 
alternative valuation approaches that incorporate non-market value in developing a 
services valuation framework. Despite highly sophisticated techniques, the value of some 
ecosystem services might be difficult to quantify in monetary term. This is especially true 
for such services, as landscape beauty or biodiversity, which are essentially cultural in 
nature. Economic valuation methodologies often fail to incorporate cultural, value-based, 
traditional or other variables in the valuation process. Most valuation models will lose the 
essence of these variables in translating them into the concepts of taste and preferences.  
 
Another limitation of traditional economic valuation of environmental services is that it 
voluntarily tries to isolate elements of ecosystems to quantify their incremental value. 
Such an approach tends to undervalue the multifunctional aspect of complex socio-
ecological landscapes.62 However, expanding valuation processes from traditional 
targeted valuation techniques to an integrated landscape approach may significantly 
increase the complexity of the process. 
 
Understanding the Legal and Policy Environment 
Regulatory and Fiscal Environment 
 
In setting up PES schemes, it is essential to assess the existing regulatory and fiscal 
environment. This is important to make sure that the newly created system will not run 
into regulatory or fiscal hurdles that would affect its development and/or reduce its 
effectiveness or attenuate its positive impacts. Regulatory and fiscal reforms to remove 
existing policy distortions and counter-incentives to conservation or sustainable land uses 
may therefore be a prerequisite to the creation of a PES scheme.  
 
For example, perverse subsidies in the form of free or unregulated access to resources or 
regressive pricing mechanisms must be identified and reformed prior to the creation of 
the PES system market. Otherwise, these counter-incentives distort market signals and 
may considerably reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of the PES system.  
 
While it is not essential to adopt specific laws for the creation of PES schemes, it may be 
useful to modify the regulatory framework and/or fiscal policies to support the 
development of PES schemes. The forest law reforms undertaken by Costa Rica in the 
1990s provide a good example of the central impact that regulatory and fiscal reforms can 
have on the development of a PES scheme. In 1997, the Costa Rican Forestry Law was 
amended to allow land users to receive payments for specified land uses, including new 
plantations, sustainable logging, and conservation of natural forests. In addition, the 
Costa Rican Forest Law specifically recognized four types of environmental services: 
carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation services, hydrological services, scenic 
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beauty and ecotourism.63 The law also introduced a new fuel tax to finance forest 
conservation and established Fonafifo to raise funds and manage the PES scheme.  
 
In a similar manner, a regulatory reform introduced in Ecuador in 1999 allowed public 
enterprises to allocate resources to privately constituted financial mechanisms. This 
regulatory change allowed the Empresa Metropolitana de Alcantarillado y Água Potable 
de Quito (EMAAP-Q) and the Empresa Eléctrica de Quito (EEQ) to allocate resources to 
the newly constituted Fondo Nacional del Água (Fonag), the financial mechanism created 
to manage the PES scheme in the watershed providing water to the city of Quito.64
 
Policy reforms can also be instrumental in the development of PES schemes. The 
Ecuadorian National Biodiversity Policy considers markets for environmental services 
within Ecuador’s ecosystems as a means of protecting these ecosystems and recommends 
the establishment of the following instruments: 
 
? A payment system for the protection of mountainsides, provision of water 
from forests, and protection of coasts; 
? Payment for environmental services on public and private lands (including 
in the National Protected Areas System), for the provision of water for 
hydroelectric plants, irrigation and human use; erosion control and global 
climate change services (for example, carbon sequestration); 
? An adequate compensation system to landowners, whether individuals or 
communities, for the lands that generate the services; 
? Investment in the protection and maintenance of lands in order to ensure 
the continuity and quality of the environmental service; 
? Investment in the social development of the communities within or around 
the lands in question.65 
 
This new policy framework can support the development of multiple PES schemes in the 
country.  
Property Rights 
 
Property rights play a central role in the establishment of PES schemes. Deforestation and 
overexploitation of forest resources are often related to insecure tenure or unclear 
property rights. Land tenure reform may therefore be one of the best strategies to address 
the overexploitation of resources. In addition, the existence of strong and undisputed 
tenure is a prerequisite for the creation of a successful PES scheme. In absence of strong 
tenure, PES schemes may exacerbate conflict over resources or simply be ineffective in 
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addressing the root causes of overexploitation. The distribution of payments to land users 
can also be problematic when property and access rights are not well defined. 
 
There are several different constituting elements of property rights and their specific 
implementation may vary among countries. The conceptual scheme for common property 
rights regimes proposed by Schlager and Ostrom provides a valuable framework for 
exploring the relationships between property rights, ecosystem management and 
livelihoods. These authors break down property rights into a series of rights according to 
the authority they grant: 
 
Access: The right to enter a defined physical property and enjoy non-
extractive benefits, primarily recreational activities. 
Withdrawal: The right to extract the resources or products of a system (e.g., 
catch fish, gather fuel wood and water for irrigation or human consumption). 
Management: The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the 
resource. 
Exclusion: The right to determine who will have an access or withdrawal 
right, and how those rights may be transferred. 
Alienation: The right to transfer the rights of management and exclusion.66
 
This conception allows much flexibility in adapting property rights to the specific 
conditions of countries, regions or communities.  
 
Land tenure issues are also central in determining whether PES schemes will benefit poor 
land users or not. If PES schemes are implemented in the context of secure and 
undisputed property rights over the landscape providing ecosystems services, poor 
communities are likely to benefit from the system. On the other hand, if poor 
communities’ rights to the resource base are limited, it is likely that the PES system may 
contribute to their further marginalization by undermining their access to resources. For 
example, the Costa Rican model tends to focus payments on large and medium size 
private landowners and neglect small landowners, indigenous communities and land 
users without registered property titles.67 This may undermine sustainable use and 
conservation efforts by further marginalizing the poorest communities, which may revert 
to unsustainable or illegal land uses to generate revenues.  
 
In Latin America, the inequitable distribution of property rights or the persistence of 
unclear land tenure regimes is often deeply rooted in history and maintained by current 
socioeconomic power structures. Securing access to the resources base through land 
tenure reforms therefore remains a considerable challenge in the region  
 
Establishing an Institutional Structure 
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Supporting institutions assume key functions in PES schemes, including scientific 
research, capacity building, technical assistance, certification, fund management, 
marketing, and linkages with national and international actors.68 It may be necessary to 
create new institutions to support new PES schemes. In these situations, the start-up costs 
can be significantly higher, but they are incurred at the beginning only and can be 
absorbed over time.  
 
In theory, the institutional structure should minimize transaction costs and allow the 
maximum transfer efficiency from beneficiaries to resources users. In practice, such 
governance structures need to take root into existing local institutions and communities. 
New institutions may be caught in local conflicts over access to resources or land uses. 
The setting up of governance structures may therefore require strong external leadership 
as well as confidence-building strategies to make sure that land users and beneficiaries 
will buy into the new system. In order to build trust, institutions supporting PES schemes 
must be as participatory and transparent as possible. However, this may increase 
transaction costs. There are therefore trade-offs between transparency and participation 
requirements, and the objective to minimize transaction costs. 
 
The Costa Rican national PES scheme is surely the most complex and institutionally 
sophisticated one in the world. Fonafifo is responsible for the collection of funds and for 
the overall management of the PES system. However, contracts with land users are 
processed regionally according to guidelines established by the Ministry of Environment 
and Energy (Minae).  The Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (Sinac) or NGOs 
such as Fundecor act as contracting agencies: they handle applications, sign contracts and 
monitor implementation. In addition, the Oficina Costarricense de Implantación 
Conjunta (OCIC) was established to handle carbon transactions at the national level.69  
 
The creation of PES schemes also involves the creation of institutions, although at a 
smaller scale, in other countries of the hemisphere. In Mexico, the National Forest 
Commission is working on the design of a Mexican Forest Fund, which would support 
projects for the payment of environmental services and for the improvement of 
productive chains. However, this ambitious project has not developed into a full-scale 
PES system due to a lack of funding. Also in Mexico, under the Scolel Té PES system, a 
management system—Plan Vivo—provides operating procedures on administrative, 
planning, monitoring and transaction functions.70 In Salvador, a national Ecoservicios 
project is being developed with support from the World Bank and the GEF. One of the 
main focuses of the project is to strengthen institutions to support the creation of local 
markets for environmental services in priority project areas involving 300 farmers on a 
5,000 ha area.71
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In watershed-based PES, the presence of watershed institutions can facilitate the setting-
up of PES systems. For example, in the Cauca Valley in Colombia, water user 
associations act as private foundations to fund watershed conservation activities that are 
coordinated by the local water authority.72 This example shows that building on existing 
associations or institutions can greatly facilitate the setting up of PES schemes and reduce 
their transaction costs. 
 
Financing the PES System 
 
The development of an appropriate financing platform is key in the establishment of a 
successful PES system. The objective is to generate a continuous flow of financial 
resources into the system to fund payments over the long term. PES systems involve 
three types of financing needs:  
 
? The cost of establishing the system (e.g., scientific research, creation of 
institutions, stakeholder consultations, training).  
? Payments to land users. 
? Ongoing management costs of the system (management, monitoring, and 
so on).73 
 
Several sources of financing are available to PES systems, including: 
 
? Donations and grants from national and international organizations; 
? Government payments and subsidies;  
? Payments from beneficiaries; 
? Market development for related goods and services at the national and 
international level. 
 
Government payments can be funded through earmarked taxes, user fees or other fiscal 
instruments. The rationale for government intervention in financing PES schemes is that 
it may already be paying for the provision of environmental services through other 
means, or using different policy instruments to reach similar objectives. The allocation of 
government resources through PES schemes might be more effective and cost-efficient 
than these alternative approaches.  Payments from beneficiaries can be collected in the 
form of voluntary payments, user fees, and charges or through negotiated arrangements 
between the financing mechanism and beneficiaries.  
 
PES schemes are often initiated with external resources and incorporate payments from 
beneficiaries to ensure a constant flow of resources once they are established. At a later 
stage, market development for environmentally preferable goods and services may bring 
additional revenues to land users. This can also allow a diversification of revenues that 
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will increase the stability of land use in the long run. Issues related to market 
development and revenue diversification are discussed in the third part of this report. 
 
International Sources 
 
PES schemes often need external resources in the form of grants and donations from 
international organizations or environmental NGOs to cover their start up costs. Indeed, 
several PES schemes have been initiated by international organizations and conservation 
NGOs and still depend on external financial support for their survival. While external 
support can constitute a positive driver in the short run, it can make the PES system 
heavily dependent on continuing international support and put into question the 
sustainability of the scheme if support is withdrawn. For example, in the Pimampiro 
watershed in Ecuador, the termination of support from the Inter-American Foundation 
jeopardized the survival of the PES system.74
 
Such difficulties have been avoided in Quito where Fonag was established as a non-
declining endowment fund that can receive contributions from government and the 
private sector. The endowment, provided by The Nature Conservancy and EMAAP-Q, is 
not spent to ensure the long-term sustainability of the PES system. In addition to the 
endowment, Fonag receives contributions from water users, mainly EMAAP-Q and EEQ. 
The fund is open and participatory: each contributor is a member of the board of directors 
and receives a number of votes proportional to its contribution. This approach contributes 
to the long term sustainability of the PES scheme.75 Similar mechanisms are being 
developed by The Nature Conservancy in Bogotá, Colombia and Tarija, Bolivia.76
 
International financing has also played an important role in Costa Rica where the GEF 
invested US$8 million in the Ecomarkets program, including US$5 million for forest 
conservation payments in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridors.77 In addition, the 
Word Bank has provided a US$32.8 million loan and the Costa Rican government 
US$8.6 million in counterpart funding.78
 
Government Subsidies 
 
Governmental support in the form of direct subsidies for the creation of PES schemes can 
generate dependency issues similar to that from international sources. Indeed, state 
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subsidies are subject to government changes or policy reforms and can be withdrawn at 
any time. PES schemes relying on governmental payments can therefore be vulnerable 
and potentially unsustainable in the long run. However, their status can be strengthened if 
enshrined in laws, decrees or constitutional documents.    
 
Governments may also wish to provide temporary subsidies to support the development 
of a market for environmental services. However, such an approach may raise issues 
associated with the political economy of subsidies. For example, in a pilot project in six 
watersheds in Mexico, the Mexican government is itself compensating land users in the 
hope that beneficiaries will accept providing payments themselves once the pilot period is 
over.79 However, such an approach may create expectations of permanent government 
payments and it is far from certain that beneficiaries will take responsibility instead of 
lobbying government for the maintenance of payments once the pilot period is over. 
 
Charges and User Fees 
  
Financial contributions from beneficiaries can take several forms, including charges and 
user fees. Charges and user fees are common in watershed-based PES schemes since 
water fees are usually in place for urban water utilities, hydroelectric producers or 
industries. They can be collected in the form of new user fees for water users or simply 
by using part of water utility revenues to fund the PES scheme.80
 
Charges are used in the El Escondido watershed in Honduras where the PES system was 
financed by a 35 percent increase in residential consumer water bills.81 It is also used 
Costa Rica where the Heredia water utility, the Empresa de Servicios Públicos de 
Heredia (ESPH), charges an “environmentally adjusted water rate.” The revenues 
generated by this additional charge are put into a trust fund that invests in PES in the 
mountainous region of Heredia with the objective of protecting the water sources for the 
city of Heredia.82  
 
User fees are employed in Ecuador, where Fonag is funded by one percent of water utility 
revenues.83 Similarly, Colombia has introduced charges for forest watershed services as a 
means to provide earmarked revenues for watershed protection. These charges include 
payments from electricity companies and hydropower plants equivalent to three percent 
of their revenues allocated to the protection of local or regional watershed. In addition, 
promoters of water-related projects must also provide payments equivalent to one percent 
of their investment, to be allocated in watershed protection projects. Finally, between 
1993 and 2002, municipalities and provinces had to allocate one percent of their budget 
to acquire land in order to protect watersheds.84
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 Earmarked Taxes 
 
Earmarked taxes can bring a stable and continuous flow of revenues for PES schemes 
since their revenues are specifically allocated to fund conservation activities. In addition, 
they may be less vulnerable to government budget reallocations than non-earmarked 
taxes. However, they can also create problems of financial dependency in the PES 
system. For example, in Costa Rica only 10 percent of land area under PES receives 
payments from services buyers and the system is heavily dependent on a gas tax.85
 
In the states of Paraná and Minas Gerais in Brazil, five percent of the value added sales 
tax (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (ICMS-E)) is allocated to 
municipalities that commit to forest conservation in watersheds providing drinking 
water.86 This tax is generating US$17.5 million annually in the state of Paraná and 
US$5.2 million in Minas Gerais and has led to the protection of over a million hectares in 
each state.87 However, some municipalities have adopted a broad interpretation of the 
earmarking criteria and used the revenues for activities that are not directly related to 
conservation. Criteria governing the allocation of earmarked taxes must therefore be 
carefully defined and enforced to make sure that they are consistent with the objectives of 
PES schemes. 
 
Voluntary Payments and other Transactions 
 
Voluntary payments and other transactions can also be negotiated with beneficiaries that 
are willing to pay for the provision of services. Such payments are often negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis, according to the specific conditions of the PES scheme and on the 
nature of the beneficiary. For example, under the Scolel Té project in Mexico, the 
International Automobile Federation agreed to buy 5,500 tons of carbon in 1997.88 A 
carbon transaction worth US$2 million was also concluded by OCIC in Costa Rica in 
1997.89
 
Other examples can be found in Latin America. In the Cauca Valley in Colombia, 
agricultural water users pay a voluntary fee to invest in upstream watershed protection 
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and forest conservation.90 In Mexico, the municipality of Coatepec in the state of 
Veracruz has proposed a voluntary extra payment of two pesos on consumer water bills 
to finance conservation in the upper watershed. In Costa Rica, the Matamoros 
Hydroelectric Company (Empresa Hidroeléctrica Matamoros) signed a voluntary 
agreement in 1999 in which it agreed to pay US$15 per hectare annually to Fonafifo to 
finance conservation or reforestation activities within the basin over a five-year period.91 
Since 1997, Fonafifo has also concluded agreements with the following companies: 
Energía Global, Hidroeléctrica Platanar, Compañía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz, Florida 
Ice and Farm.92
 
Managing Transaction costs  
 
The transaction costs involved in setting up and managing PES schemes are central to the 
cost-efficiency of PES schemes. Given that PES schemes involve the creation of new 
markets with legal, fiscal and institutional support, there is a risk of seeing transaction 
costs exceed the potential benefits of the system. Overall, if transaction costs are too 
high, PES schemes may not be a cost-optimal strategy to deliver environmental services. 
Managing transaction costs becomes a priority of PES schemes in that context. 
 
As mentioned before, the start-up costs for PES schemes may be significant. The main 
transaction costs are related to contract management and monitoring. At first the 
operating costs may be high, but they are likely to decrease over time as markets mature 
and institutional support needed becomes less intensive. Operating costs are generally 
lower when land users are few. However, when land users are numerous, collective 
contracting can reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs will be reduced where land 
users are already organized and well structured enough to receive and redistribute 
payments. The operating costs are also closely linked to the type of contracts and 
payments that will be used in the system. The costs of contracting with land users are 
generally lower when contractual obligations are simple.  
 
In Costa Rica, participants in the national PES schemes must submit detailed 
management plans. These management plans must include a description of proposed land 
use changes as well as information on land tenure, topography, soils, climate, drainage, 
current land use and related carrying capacity as well as forest fire, illegal hunting and 
harvesting prevention plans. Management plans must also include a monitoring 
schedule.93 Fundecor acts as intermediary and supports farmers in drafting these 
management plans and obtaining contracts from Fonafifo.  
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In addition to raising transaction costs, sophisticated contracts can also act as barriers to 
entry for poor land users who lack resources to develop detailed management plans. This 
problem may be circumvented through collective contracting or by contracting through 
NGO intermediaries. According to a study conducted in Costa Rica, contracting through 
intermediaries is less cumbersome for land users but it increases transaction costs. The 
study observed that farmers often accessed the PES system through intermediaries who 
would charge 12–18 percent in administration costs. The same study concludes that 
resorting to intermediaries however reduces delays in obtaining a PES contract with the 
contracting authority.94
 
The waiting time for contract approval may also constitute a significant transaction cost 
that prevents small landowners from entering the system. Some PES schemes may 
require that the land area subject to a new proposal be subject to strict conservation 
measures while the management plan and PES contract are pending approval. This may 
be impossible for small landowners who cannot afford to place a portion of their land out 
of production.95  
 
Some interesting schemes have been undertaken to reduce transaction costs associated 
with contracting for poor or indigenous communities. For example, under Plan Vivo in 
the Scolel Té project in Mexico, the Fondo Bioclimático, which is responsible for 
contracting with farmers, makes initial contacts with farmer associations and organizes 
meetings to build farmers’ knowledge. Farmers, individually or collectively, then have to 
produce simple management plans explaining the type of forestry or agroforestry activity 
they want to develop, where it will be located, what vegetation and current practices will 
be modified, and the extent of labor and materials needed. This pilot project is now being 
reproduced in India and Mozambique.96
 
Contract renewal procedures can also involve significant costs. One way to reduce 
transaction cost is to automatically renew contracts or at least to develop a lighter 
approval process for contract renewals when land users show that they have been 
consistently complying with their obligations throughout the duration of the contract. In 
Costa Rica, payments are made under five-year contracts that are renewable. Some 
contracts can extend 10–15 years, and the contractual obligations are transferable with 
property deeds.97
 
An effective monitoring strategy is essential to making sure that land users are complying 
with their contractual obligations, implementing their management plans, and generating 
needed environmental services. Monitoring plays an important role in ensuring 
compliance and documenting the provision of services. However, monitoring can 
significantly raise transaction costs, especially when contracts involve detailed 
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obligations and when payments are targeted to very specific land uses. For example, the 
implementation of the RISEMP project is accompanied with intensive monitoring to 
allow a detailed analysis of its effectiveness. This considerably raises the transaction 
costs of the project.98 There is, therefore, a need to establish an appropriate balance 
between the need for effective monitoring and the importance of controlling transaction 
costs. 
 
III. Conditions for Success and Emerging Best Practices 
 
The survey of PES schemes conducted for this report shows that a multiplicity of models 
coexists and that no single one has so far emerged as the standard approach to 
establishing PES schemes. Moreover, PES schemes are usually adapted to the very 
specific conditions under which they are established and to the specific characteristics of 
markets for different environmental services. This explains the great diversity of models 
observed.   
 
The theory and practice of payments for environmental service is in its infancy. Most 
PES schemes are recent or have been running for a few years only. Consequently, there 
are few empirical studies that document best practices and lessons learned. However, 
initial lessons and emerging best practices are documented in the literature. This section 
presents a summary of these observations. 
 
There are several ways to measure the success of PES schemes. Indicators of success 
may include: 
 
? The number of participants (both beneficiaries and land users); 
? The land area that is included under the PES scheme; 
? The extent to which a PES scheme is generating land use changes; 
? The net additional revenues that a PES scheme brings to land users; 
? The distributional impacts of PES schemes, especially their impact on 
poor or traditional communities; 
? The financial sustainability of the system in the long run; 
? The extent to which the system is generating environmental services; 
? The transfer efficiency of the system (the net percentage of revenues that 
end up as net income gains for land users); and  
? The cost-effectiveness of PES schemes compared to alternatives. 
 
The design of PES schemes plays a central role in guaranteeing their success. PES 
schemes tend to work best when they have the following characteristics:  
 
? They are based on clear and consensual scientific evidence linking land 
uses to the provision of services; 
? They clearly define environmental services to be provided; 
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? Their contracts and payments are flexible, ongoing and open-ended;  
? Their transaction costs do not exceed potential benefits; 
? They rely on multiple sources of revenues delivering money flows that are 
sufficient and sustainable in time; 
? Compliance, land use changes, and the provision of services are closely 
monitored; and 
? They are flexible enough to allow adjustments to improve their 
effectiveness and efficiency and to adapt to changing conditions. 
 
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) propose the following key steps to develop successful 
markets for environmental services: 
 
1) Identify benefits provided by a specific service and by determination of 
(forestry) activities that deliver this service; 
2) Undertake a feasibility study; 
3) Establish willingness to pay; 
4) Formalize property rights; 
5) Establish payment mechanisms and supporting institutions; and 
6) Undertake pilot activities and feedback to market design.  
 
In addition, pilot projects constitute an important element in the process of creating a 
successful PES. 
 
The Strengths and Limitations of PES Schemes 
 
So far, PES schemes have proved effective in application to watersheds, carbon 
sequestration, biodiversity conservation, landscape beauty and bundled services. PES 
schemes have also been effective at both small and large scales. Most PES schemes are 
created at a small scale, but the Costa Rican example shows that the approach is also 
applicable at a national scale. Despite criticisms regarding its lack of flexibility, the Costa 
Rican experience is undoubtedly a success: Fonafifo allocated more than US$80 million 
and incorporated 314,472 ha into the PES system between 1997 and 2002.99  
 
In addition, PES schemes are highly flexible and adaptable to different contexts as 
demonstrated by the multiplicity of experimentations underway in the hemisphere. 
However, PES schemes as they are currently developing also face difficulties and 
limitations. These limitations of current PES schemes include the following: 
 
? They are often based on scientific generalizations, that have not been 
proven by empirical studies; 
? They are sometimes implemented in a context where they are not the most 
cost-effective method to attain the goals established; 
? Service providers, users and the service itself are sometimes not properly 
identified; 
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? They are executed without a proper monitoring or control mechanism; 
? The cost of environmental services are set arbitrarily and do not 
correspond to studies on demand and economic valuation of the resource; 
? Their design is not based on previous socioeconomic or biophysical 
studies; 
? They may offer perverse incentives to land users, or they may displace 
environmental problems or unsustainable land uses to surrounding areas; 
? They depend largely on external financial resources; and 
? Programs and activities are disseminated poorly among the local 
population.100 
 
PES schemes are in their very early stages of development and consequently their 
transaction costs remain very high—in many cases, overwhelmingly so. However, such a 
situation can be considered a normal phase in the development of new markets. PES 
markets should mature over time and take root where they are most cost-efficient. In 
those circumstances, they should become less dependent on external sources of financing 
over time. 
 
Diversifying Revenues for Sustainable Livelihoods 
 
Among the emerging best practices that can be identified, the diversification of revenues 
for communities involved in PES schemes through the creation of new markets for 
environmental goods and services appears to be one of the most promising. As discussed 
earlier in this report, revenue diversification through market creation is a good strategy to 
ensure the sustainability of PES schemes over time since it raises the level of revenues 
associated with sustainable land uses. For example, participants in the Scolel Té project 
in Chiapas, Mexico, consider the payments for carbon sequestration minimal in terms of 
revenue generation, but the possibility to access markets for certified timber provides an 
additional incentive to enter the system.101 Revenue diversification can also help 
communities reduce their dependence on a single commodity, thereby reducing their 
vulnerability to price fluctuations on world markets.  
 
Markets for environmental goods and services have been growing rapidly over the last 
decade. For example, Barry et al. estimate the world market for non-timber forest 
products could be as high as US$7 billion.102  In 1999, the world market for organic food 
was US$14.5 billion, growing at a rate of 20–30 percent a year. The premium price for 
organic products ranges from 20 percent to 200 percent.103 Mexico has been successful 
with its shade-grown, organic coffee and sustainably harvested palm.  
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However, even though the potential of these niche markets is strong, the capacity to enter 
them is lacking in poor communities of the hemisphere. Indeed, entering markets for 
certified forest products or organic agriculture requires significant technical capacities to 
obtain certifications and effectively market products. As a consequence, poor 
communities are often excluded from these markets. In addition, as observed by Barry 
(2003), forest products certification is often seen as too costly by local producers, given 
the lack of guarantee that they will obtain a premium price or increased market share to 
recover the costs of certification in the transition period.  
 
In line with this observation, a study conducted by the Salvadorian Foundation for Coffee 
Studies (Procafe) concluded that markets for shade-grown coffee were not mature enough 
to ensure a stable premium price over time, and that certification would not be profitable 
for small Salvadorian farms of less than seven hectares, due to additional expenses linked 
to certified production.104 This suggests that in order for smaller farms to join markets for 
certified products, they need insurance from market fluctuations and support to cover the 
extra production and administrative costs associated with certification. 
 
PES schemes can play a significant role in that regard by including specific support for 
market development and revenue diversification in their compensation packages. Such 
support may include capacity building, the creation of local marketing institutions or 
insurance services. In addition, there are huge information gaps in the market between 
environmental goods and services suppliers and potential buyers that can be filled in part 
through the development of local marketing structures. The Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation has been instrumental in filling those gaps and contributing 
to the development of markets for shade grown coffee and other environmental goods 
and services in North America.  
 
In addition to markets for organic agriculture and certified timber, other markets are also 
emerging with various levels of success. Ecotourism seems to be a promising market to 
support revenue diversification in communities involved in PES schemes. In 1998, the 
International Ecotourism Society estimated that 40–60 percent of the 528.4 million 
tourists focused on nature.105 Economic benefits from ecotourism can involve direct 
payments from tourist agencies to land users, or other activities or services that can be 
offered by local communities to tourists. These revenue opportunities will only be 
maximized when adequate infrastructures are in place to deliver tourists services and 
channel revenues into productive activities. So far, however, most revenues have been 
captured by tour operators, with poor communities often restricted to wage labor.  
 
In Belize, the Toledo Ecotourism Association represents 10 local Mopan, Kekchi, Maya 
and Garifuna rainforest communities totaling 6,000 people. The association aims to 
develop ecotourism services that are compatible with the traditional livelihoods of these 
communities. These include guided tours, stays in community guesthouses, handicrafts, 
musical performances, crafts lessons and forest canopy walks. Direct payments are made 
to services providers and 20 percent of revenues are allocated to a central fund that 
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provides management, marketing, community conservation and development services.106 
In Mexico, communities in Mazunte and Ventanilla, Oaxaca, and Selva del Marinero, 
Veracruz, have organized to generate revenues from ecotourism by securing access to the 
resources and developing value added services. A portion of the revenues generated is 
reinvested in conservation.107  
 
Bioprospecting activities can also be part of a revenue diversification strategy. Although 
markets for these activities have not met expectations in the last decade, and while they 
are unlikely to generate enough revenues at this stage to support long-term land use 
changes, they may be part of a revenue diversification strategy that is based on multiple 
land use. Revenues from bioprospecting activities can be obtained in the form of fees, 
milestones payments or royalties. Bioprospecting can also bring non-monetary benefits, 
such as capacity-building, support for biodiversity science, sustainable economic 
activities based on the supply of raw materials or direct financial contributions to 
conservation programs. In addition, it can also lead to the development of a biodiversity-
based industry, for example to supply samples to industry for screening, raw processed 
materials for advanced research or manufacturing purposes.108
 
Generating Benefits for Poor Communities 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the design and implementation of PES schemes 
raise distributional issues that need to be considered to make sure that they will not 
exacerbate existing inequities or create new ones. Although the primary objective of PES 
schemes is not the alleviation of poverty, they may not work effectively if poor 
communities, which are most dependent on the land for their livelihoods, are excluded 
from the system. Efforts must therefore be made to integrate these populations and extend 
the benefits of PES schemes to them. 
 
Poor people, indigenous communities, women and minorities tend to have insecure land 
tenure, to be concentrated on marginal lands and to be under-represented within local 
representation institutions. In that context, there is a risk that PES schemes might further 
marginalize them within their own communities by establishing inequitable payment 
schemes or by excluding them. Under such conditions, PES schemes could be 
undermined by growing conflict over resources or by the spread of illegal activities 
resulting from the exclusion of important segments of the population. 
 
Entering into PES schemes should not make poor communities more vulnerable to 
climate or market-driven revenue fluctuations. Poor communities may reduce the risk 
associated with market price fluctuations or climatic variations by diversifying their 
production and their sources of revenues. However, long-term, inflexible contracts under 
PES schemes can lock poor communities in single land-use practices, thereby decreasing 
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their flexibility to adapt to changing climatic or market conditions. This may increase 
their vulnerability to price shocks or climatic variation. It is important that PES schemes 
overcome this hazard by introducing flexibility in the types of land uses that are allowed 
under the system and by offering insurance compensation in case of loss of revenues.  
 
There is also a need to look at the redistributive effect of the setting up of PES schemes, 
notably on labor and land value. PES-induced changes in land use can increase or 
decrease the labor force employed locally in farming. For example, if a PES scheme 
results in a conversion of labor-intensive agricultural lands to conservation practices; it 
might decrease farm labor and affect landless peasants.  On the other hand, new agro-
pastoral practices, usually more labor-intensive, promoted under PES schemes may 
generate new employment opportunities. The silvopastoral practices promoted under the 
World Bank’s RISEMP project, for example, are expected to increase farm labor use in 
the project areas by 8–13 percent in Colombia, 34 percent in Costa Rica, and as much as 
100 percent in Nicaragua.109  
 
PES schemes can also increase the value of marginal lands and increase competition for 
access to land resources.110 The establishment of a market for environmental services 
may act as an incentive for wealthier groups to expand the land area under their control at 
the expense of poor land users. There is anecdotal evidence that this has happened in 
Colombia’s Cauca Valley, for example.111 Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) also fear that 
the growth of carbon markets will lead carbon providers to buy-out small farmers in order 
to expand the land area they dedicate to carbon sequestration, thereby capturing 
economies of scale. In that situation, poor farmers could be displaced from their land by 
increasing competition arising from expanding carbon markets.  
 
In order to avoid such outcomes, the Scolel Té project in Mexico tries to integrate 
indigenous communities into small-scale carbon trading. The project benefits 400 
individuals from 30 indigenous communities representing four different ethnic groups. 
The particularity of the Plan Vivo system in the Scolel Té project is its ability to initiate 
carbon trading at a very small scale and to function with minimal resources.112 If this 
project generates positive results, it could provide a useful platform to integrate poor 
indigenous communities into the emerging global carbon market. 
 
Based on the preceding observations on the potential impacts of PES schemes on poor 
and indigenous communities, the following strategies can be advanced to maximize the 
benefits and minimize the chance that the PES scheme further marginalizes the 
communities:      
 
? Clarify and strengthen land tenure; 
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? Create or strengthen cooperative institutions to reduce transaction costs; 
? Define cost-effective and flexible payments mechanisms; 
? Provide flexibility in eligible land uses; 
? Facilitate access to start-up financing; and 
? Invest in community capacity-building.113 
 
In addition, lessons learned so far in implementing PES schemes show improved chances 
of success in including poor communities when the incentive system created by the PES 
is directed towards the social structure as a whole (communities as opposed to individual 
farmers) and when it is flexible in its application (allowing for a broader set of options to 
obtain results).   
Building Capacities in Communities 
 
Community capacity building is a key accompanying strategy to support revenue 
diversification and the generation of benefits for marginalized communities. By 
supporting capacity building in smaller, poor communities, PES schemes can strengthen 
their social capital, thereby reducing their vulnerability to land use changes and 
increasing their capacity to seize market opportunities and to voice their interest in 
decision making.  
 
For example, one result of the Scolel Té project in Mexico was to improve farmers’ skills 
by teaching surveying, mapping, financial planning and silviculture. The project also 
resulted in community empowerment.114 In addition, a survey conducted in the Sarapiquí 
region in Costa Rica found that participants highly valued the information and training 
they received on forest management.115 This suggests that a significant portion of the 
benefits associated with participation in PES schemes is not linked to increased revenues, 
but to various information and training services provided that end up strengthening the 
capacities of participants.  
 
However, capacity-building strategies are often lacking in PES schemes, despite the 
needs of participating communities. In their study of the Costa Rican PES system, 
Miranda et al. (2004) documented that farmers knew very little about the way the system 
functioned, since they entered it through intermediaries. Such an information gap can 
develop as a serious weakness of PES schemes over the longer term. Therefore, 
developing local capacities and knowledge should be one of their main priorities. 
 
In their review of 287 PES schemes in the world, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) 
identified three priorities for building capacities in the participating poor communities in 
order to facilitate their integration into new markets for environmental services: 
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? Strengthen capacity for market participation. Training in marketing, 
negotiation, management, financial accounting, contract formulation and 
conflict resolution are important. Technical skills relating to forest 
management for environmental services are also needed. 
 
? Market support center. To improve poor people’s ability to participate in 
emerging markets, a market support center may offer access to 
information on recent prices and transactions, a contact point for potential 
buyers, sellers and intermediaries, an advice bureau and practical research 
that draws together emerging best-practices. 
 
? Access to finance. Availability of finance is vital to negotiating and 
concluding environmental service deals. Where the financial sector is 
underdeveloped, and the environmental service sector faces significant 
hurdles in accessing funds, the government may have a key role to play in 
promoting improved access.116 
 
Such capacity building strategies may have long-term impacts that will not only support 
the sustainability of PES schemes, but also produce positive outcomes in terms of 
community development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As revealed in this report, payments for environmental services are an innovative and 
relatively young market-based instrument for environmental protection. As a 
consequence, it is still early to assess the overall effectiveness and efficiency of PES 
schemes and to identify lessons and best practices. However, this report has tried to 
provide preliminary observations based on the current state of the literature on PES 
schemes.  
 
PES schemes are highly adaptable and several different models currently coexist in 
different markets and locations. If one conclusion can be derived from this state of 
affairs, it is that there is no single, transferable model for PES systems and that each one 
must be tailored to the specific conditions of the market for a given environmental service 
in a given location. 
 
Another observation of PES schemes is that they may not constitute a cost-optimal 
instrument in all circumstances. Indeed, their success depends in great part on pre-
existing conditions. PES systems work best when services are visible and beneficiaries 
are well organized, and when land user communities are well structured, have clear and 
secure property rights, strong legal frameworks, and are relatively wealthy or have access 
to resources. These conditions minimize sources of interference with the newly created 
market and reduce transaction costs. This suggests that part of the success of PES 
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schemes rests in the selection of regions/communities where they will be implemented or 
on work conducted in their preparatory phase.  
 
Transaction costs in markets for environmental services are still high due to the 
immaturity of certain markets. This makes PES schemes highly dependent on external 
sources of funding, which may undermine their sustainability in the long run. However, it 
is likely that transaction costs will decrease over time as markets for environmental 
services mature. The development of new markets may support revenue diversification 
and ensure a more stable, long lasting flow of revenues in PES schemes. In that sense, the 
future of PES schemes may be tied to the development of niche markets for certified 
forest products, organic agriculture or ecotourism, which have the potential to bring 
significant revenues. In addition, the expansion of carbon markets can constitute a major 
sources or revenues for PES schemes if the persisting uncertainty about these markets is 
lifted by the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
One last observation is that PES schemes must be designed and implemented with a view 
toward minimizing tensions between the concurrent objectives of effectiveness, 
efficiency and equity. As shown in this report, this involves significant trade-offs that 
may greatly affect the success or failure of PES schemes.  It is likely that new approaches 
will be found to attenuate these tensions as the body of experience with PES schemes 
continues to grow. 
 
In conclusion, PES schemes have the potential to become very valuable transfer 
mechanisms for internalizing positive environmental externalities and generating new 
revenues for sustainable development. This potential will be gradually fulfilled as 
markets for environmental services mature over time and as PES schemes become more 
financially sustainable. In addition, their positive effects on sustainable development will 
be greatest if their distributional impacts are considered and if concrete efforts are made 
to build capacities in poor and indigenous communities. Otherwise, there is a significant 
risk that they will perpetuate or exacerbate existing inequities in resource use and simply 
continue unsustainable survival patterns in poor communities. 
 Appendix I: List of PES schemes surveyed 
 
Country Name Type of environmental 
services 
Scope Progress 
     
ARGENTINA La Plata/Fontana Carbon sequestration services Local Development phase 
     
BOLIVIA Noel Kempff Mercado National 
Park 
Carbon sequestration services International  Single transaction
     
Paraná  Water services Local In progress 
    
Minas Gerais  Water services Local In progress 
    
BRAZIL 
Corumbatai watershed Water services Local In progress 
     
Cauca Valley  Water services Local  Ended 
    
COLOMBIA 
Guabas River Water services Local Ongoing 
     
Fonafifo Biodiversity conservation, National/International
Carbon Sequestration, and 
Water services 
In progress since 
1996 
    
Ecomarkets    Biodiversity
conservation/carbon 
sequestration services 
Local In progress
    
COSTA RICA 
Heredia Water services Local  In progress  
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Country Name Type of environmental 
services 
Scope Progress 
     
Fonag water fund Water services Local  In progress 
    
ECUADOR 
San Pedro de Pimampiro Water services Local  Pilot 
     
El SALVADOR Ecoservicios     Various services Local/National Development phase
     
GUYANA Conservation 
International/Guyana 
Biodiversity conservation 
services 
International  In progress
     
HONDURAS El Escondido Watershed Water services  Local  In progress 
     
Lerma Chapala Bassin Water services Local Pilot 
    
Triunfo biosphere Reserve, 
Chiapas 
Water services Local  Pilot 
    
Scolel Té Project, Chiapas 
(Bioclimatic Fund)  
Carbon sequestration/ 
Biodiversity conservation 
services 
Local  Pilot
    
Coatepec, Veracruz Water services Local Proposed 
    
Mazunte &Ventanilla, Oaxaca Biodiversity 
conservation/Scenic beauty 
services 
Local  In progress
MEXICO 
Selva del Marinero, Veracruz Biodiversity Local  In progress 
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 conservation/Scenic beauty  
 43
  44
 
Country Name Type of environmental 
services 
Scope Progress 
     
Catskills, Delaware and Croton 
Watersheds 
Water services Local Done 
    
UNITED STATES 
Conservation Reserves 
Program 
Biodiversity conservation 
services 
National   On-going
10-15 yrs contracts 
     
Regional Integral Silvopastoral 
Ecosystem Management 
Project (RISEMP) 
(Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua) 
Biodiversity conservation 
services 
Local/International  Pilot
    
MULTI-
COUNTRY 
The Nature Conservancy 
(Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
Paraguay) 
Bundled services (Carbon 
sequestration/Biodiversity 
conservation) 
Local/International  Single transactions 
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